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Challenged Elites – Elites as Challengers.  
Towards a Unified Theory of  
Representative Elites  
Heinrich Best & Ursula Hoffmann-Lange∗ 
Abstract: »Aktuelle Herausforderungen für etablierte Eliten – Neue Eliten als 
Herausforderer. Bausteine einer umfassenden Theorie repräsentativer Eliten«. 
This HSR Special Issue assembles contributions on current topics of elite re-
search. They deal in particular with the challenges globalization poses for the 
traditional linkages between citizens and their representatives and their impact 
on political legitimacy. We argue that these developments upset the balance 
between a broad elite consensus embracing universal values and citizens' fears 
that their representatives pay too little attention to their demands to fight the 
negative effects of globalization on the country. We develop a unified theory 
of representative elites by combining three theorems: The theorem of antago-
nistic cooperation, the principal-agent theorem and the challenge-response 
theorem. While the first explains how elite consensus ensures effective policy 
making, the second demands responsiveness to citizen demands, and the third 
implies that fundamental social and political changes produce strains for estab-
lished intra-elite and elite-citizen relations. 
Keywords: Elite consensus, antagonistic cooperation, principal-agent theorem, 
elite responsivity, representation, globalization, challenge-response theorem, 
political protest. 
 
Research on elites, and particularly on political elites, has increased dramatical-
ly during the past thirty years. There were several reasons for this development, 
but the Third Wave of democratization played a particular role in reinvigorat-
ing interest in the subject. This was partly due to the fact that many observers 
considered conflicts within the elites of the preceding authoritarian regimes as 
a major factor in transitions to democracy, partly to the assumption that the 
mode of transition and the degree of elite replacement after democratization are 
indicative of the chances for democratic consolidation (Higley and Lengyel 
2000). Since the 1990s, a large number of empirical studies have documented 
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such elite change, especially in post-communist countries (e.g. Szelényi and 
Szelényi 1995; Best and Becker 1997; Higley, Pakulski and Wesołowski 1998; 
Best, Gebauer and Salheiser 2012). Another expanding field of elite research 
that has triggered considerable attention in recent years was the emergence of 
transnational elites (e.g. Jönsson and Tallberg 2010; Hoffmann-Lange 2012; 
Best, Lengyel and Verzichelli 2012). 
Efforts to establish elite research institutionally have also thrived. The Inter-
national Political Science Association’s –‘IPSA’ Research Committee on Polit-
ical Elites, founded in 1971, has organized an ever larger number of panels at 
the past IPSA congresses and has provided the platform for the publication of 
the Palgrave Handbook of Political Elites (Best and Higley 2018). Moreover, in 
2015, the European Consortium for Political Research – ECPR established a 
Standing Group ’Elites and Political Leadership’ in order to invigorate a net-
work of scholars working in the field of elite theory and empirical elite re-
search. 
This special issue of Historical Social Research explores new territories of 
elite theory and research by presenting recent and ongoing debates in this field. 
It comprises twelve original contributions: five of these were selected from 
presentations at the 24th International Congress of Political Science in Poznań 
(July 23-27, 2016)1 and six are contributions from members of the comparative 
study on “Support for Democracy. Citizens and their Representatives in Times 
of Crisis”, some of which were first also presented at the Poznań conference. 
The latter set of contributions studies the impact of the global economic crisis 
on support for democracy and political legitimacy in two old and five new 
democracies and will be introduced by a chapter of Klingemann and Hoff-
mann-Lange, providing background information on the theoretical focus and 
the data used by that comparative project. The themes linking all the contribu-
tions assembled in this special issue are the increasingly challenged status of 
elites under the premises of globalization, what their own contribution is to 
eliciting these challenges, and what their responses are to them.  
The subject of elites’ vulnerability, resilience and response is taken on by 
Maurizio Cotta with special emphasis on the effect accountability to national 
electorates (or the lack of it) had on how different segments of the European 
Elite System responded to the great recession after 2008. Elites’ resilience and 
control is also in the focus of the contribution by Farida Jalalzai and Meg 
Rincker, who examine in a worldwide perspective the relevance of family ties 
for the recruitment of chief executives. Elena Semenova attributes recent 
changes in German corporate recruitment and networks to an increasing inte-
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gration of the German economy in European and global markets. Jérôme 
Heurtaux shows what happens to the political elite after the collapse of an 
authoritarian regime and which paths are followed to reintegrate the political 
class after transition to democracy. Trygve Gulbrandsen shows why, how and 
with what consequences the political elites of Nordic countries have managed 
to uphold high levels of employment and welfare state benefits in their coun-
tries after the international financial crisis. Oxana Gaman-Golutvina shows 
how in the beginning of the 21st century the US-American political elite at-
tempted to consolidate the normative and institutional bases for its global lead-
ership. The contributions in both parts of this special issue open up a global 
perspective on the massive challenges elites face at the beginning of the 21st 
century and they give us clues about how and why elites succeed or failed to 
respond to them. They also provide valuable evidence for our attempt at inte-
grating disjoined elements of elite theory. 
1.  The Shifting Focus of Elite Research 
Empirical research on social backgrounds, careers and elite circulation has a 
long tradition, going back to the classic works of Pareto and Mosca. A wealth 
of cross-sectional as well as longitudinal studies based on available documenta-
tions such as parliamentary handbooks or other rosters of prominent individu-
als, constitutes a broad data base on both historical and contemporary elites and 
allows to analyzing elite change over time (Best and Cotta 2000a; Cotta and 
Best 2007). The advent of survey research opened up the additional opportunity 
to collect data on the subjective orientations of elites. Numerous surveys of 
sectoral elites (primarily political elites) have been conducted, while compre-
hensive surveys including a range of important elite sectors (politics, business, 
public administration, voluntary associations, media etc.) and internationally 
comparative surveys have been rarer because they are much more expensive 
(Aberbach et al. 2001; Hoffmann-Lange 2007; Best et al. 2012; Gulbrandsen 
2018a). Studies of elite networks, finally, have mostly been limited to the 
community level where the number of relevant elite actors is much smaller. 
However, novel methods of data gathering and data analysis have increasingly 
opened up opportunities to study elite networks at the national level (Keller 
2018). 
The dramatic social and political changes of the past decades have not failed 
to have a deep impact on elite structures and elite behaviors (Best and Higley 
2018; Vogel et al. 2019). Incumbency of political leadership positions has 
declined over the past decades, in first instance because of numerous regime 
changes, but also due to an increasing number of changes in government espe-
cially in European democracies. Lack of success in coping with political crises 
or moral wrongdoings (e.g. corruption) that used to be tolerated as minor trans-
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gressions, are punished more easily by voters and party leaders. This cannot 
only be observed in politics where poor government performance is normative-
ly expected to result in electoral defeat. Dismissals for insufficient performance 
or lack of success have become routine in many other sectors as well (Naím 
2013), most notably in business corporations if CEOs fail to achieve higher 
profits and shareholder values. 
Conversely, changes in recruitment patterns due to demographic and value 
change have opened up recruitment opportunities for members of groups that 
were traditionally excluded from access to elite positions, such as women, 
immigrants and members of ethnic or religious minorities. Although the mas-
sive expansion of higher education has not abolished inequalities in educational 
opportunities for children from lower class families, it nevertheless has led to a 
rise in the number of young people with a university degree joining the large 
pool of future elites (Zweigenhaft and Domhoff 2018). Moreover, the increased 
rotation in elite positions can be assumed to have increased the chances of 
aspirants for elite positions with unconventional backgrounds since the re-
cruitment of new incumbents is no longer perceived as necessarily involving 
long-term consequences.  
Finally, while split-ups, mergers and failures have decreased the ranks of 
traditional political parties and other powerful organizations, startup compa-
nies, new media, NGOs, economic and political consultants, as well as new 
political parties have mushroomed and have become powerful enough to suc-
cessfully compete for political influence. The latter are not bound by traditional 
loyalties to other organizations and therefore constitute challengers more prone 
to eroding traditional norms of cooperation and competition. 
The traditional model of representative democracy as portrayed by Michels, 
Schumpeter and others involved a steep gradient between political elites, a 
relatively small political stratum of political activists and the bulk of ordinary 
citizens whose political role was closely circumscribed, largely limited to that 
of political observer and voter. The landmark study on political culture con-
ducted by Almond and Verba in 1958 revealed that the political attitudes and 
political actions of the citizens in the United States and Britain largely con-
formed to that normative model. The authors characterized this civic culture as 
a “balanced political culture in which political activity, involvement and ra-
tionality exist but are balanced by passivity, traditionality, and commitment to 
parochial values“ (1989, 30). Likewise, Converse’ analysis of the political 
attitudes of Americans (1964 and 2000) studied at about the same time and 
later updated with more recent data, confirmed that the great majority of them 
displayed a relatively low level of political sophistication, while only a small 
segment of about ten percent could be considered to have a differentiated and 
internally consistent understanding of political events and issues. 
The politically quiet post World War II years, when the Western democra-
cies were preoccupied with overcoming the devastations of the war, came to an 
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end in the late 1960s with the sudden and unexpected outburst of political 
protest among students. While it started out as a protest against the Vietnam 
War, it soon developed into a more fundamental opposition against the monop-
oly of the established elites to determine policies and the slim chances of ordi-
nary voters to change the course of events. The ‘Political Action Study’, a five-
nation survey conducted in 1974, confirmed the emergence of new modes of 
political activism and a mobilization of citizens outside of the traditional politi-
cal parties and intermediary associations. A majority of the respondents in four 
of the five countries considered lawful direct political actions such as demon-
strations and petitions as a legitimate way to articulate their disapproval with 
government policies (Barnes, Kaase et al. 1979). 
In the more than 40 years that have passed since the publication of that 
study, the share of citizens in post-industrial democracies who participate in 
direct political action has increased at a breathtaking pace (Dalton 2006, 68). 
Ample empirical evidence also confirms that institutionalized and non-
institutionalized forms of citizen participation are complementary. Active citi-
zens tend to use the entire range of available options to feed their political 
preferences into the political system by voting, working within political parties, 
but also by trying to influence policy decisions through different forms of di-
rect action. Thus, the experience of the inter-war period when political protest 
frequently was used by anti-democratic movements to express fundamental 
dissatisfaction with the functioning of the democratic system – more often than 
not in combination with a rejection of democratic values and principles –, is no 
longer valid for understanding today’s protest movements most of which de-
mand more, not less democracy. 
As many observers have pointed out, this increase in political activism can 
be attributed primarily to educational expansion. However, while Inglehart and 
others have claimed that rising educational levels, in conjunction with the 
spread of mass media (especially the internet), have promoted an increase in 
political sophistication (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 28; Dalton 2006, 25), poli-
tics has remained a sphere to which most people devote little time. Likewise, a 
deeper understanding of the complexities of politics and regular political in-
volvement is still the preserve of a relatively small segment of the population. 
Moreover, political interest has not risen proportionally to the increase in edu-
cational levels.  
Nie et al.’s (1996) study of the relationship between education and demo-
cratic citizenship tried to unravel this paradox. The authors distinguished two 
analytically distinct aspects of democratic citizenship: democratic enlighten-
ment and political engagement. Democratic enlightenment involves knowledge 
of the principles of democracy and a commitment to democratic values and 
tolerance. “Political engagement, on the other hand, signifies the capability of 
citizens to pursue their preferences in politics and is characterized by attributes 
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such as participation in difficult political activities and knowledge of leaders.” 
(Nie et al. 1996, 37) 
Both aspects of democratic citizenship are related to formal education, but 
they follow a different logic. Political engagement does not only depend on 
education, but also on interest in politics and a person’s subjective ability to 
influence political developments. It requires additional cultural and social capi-
tal as well as opportunity which are in short supply. It follows what the authors 
called the relative education model. Therefore, rising educational levels have 
not automatically led to a comparable increase in political engagement. Demo-
cratic enlightenment, in contrast, is a personal attribute that follows the abso-
lute education model and is responsible for an increase in support for democrat-
ic values (Nie et al. 1996, 122). 
The study provides a pertinent explanation for the impact of formal educa-
tion on value orientations and political participation patterns in modern democ-
racies. The absolute education model explains why rising educational levels 
have contributed to a spread of pro-democratic values, lower trust in politi-
cians, and an increased readiness to contribute money and to take to the streets 
for ‘good’ political causes. Most of the latter activities, however, are intermit-
tent and limited to influencing specific issues. This conclusion is supported by 
the fact that today both established and new organizations have problems re-
cruiting and retaining members: While demonstrations may draw large crowds, 
the organizational work behind the scenes is provided by a relatively small core 
of activists. 
The combined impact of these ongoing political developments can be 
gauged by looking at the elections of the last decade in 31 European democra-
cies (Hoffmann-Lange and Kuklys 2019, 63-9). Between 2008 and 2017, a 
total of 68 legislative elections were held in the 31 countries. Excluding Nor-
way and Switzerland that have fixed legislative terms, one-third of these elec-
tions were held ahead of schedule after a break-up of the previous government. 
Moreover, citizens have become more electorally mobile and do not hesitate to 
change their voting choice from one election to the next. Losses or gains of 
more than 10 percentage points for a party could be observed in 57.4% of the 
68 European elections under study. It was highest in the post-communist de-
mocracies (73.1% of 26 elections). Studies of the long-term development of 
voter volatility in European democracies confirm a considerable increase of 
electoral volatility from fairly high electoral stability in the first 25 years after 
World War II to considerably higher levels in the mid-2010s (Drummond 
2006; Chiaramonte and Emanuele 2015). 
The declining reliance of citizens on traditional mass organizations has, in 
turn, also resulted in a decline in membership that has especially affected polit-
ical parties and labor unions (Putnam 2000), although this decline has been 
more than compensated for by the proliferation of advocacy groups and initia-
tives promoting social and political causes, ranging from loosely structured 
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local groups to national and even global movements. At the same time, howev-
er, these new groups and initiatives are organizationally less institutionalized 
and more ephemeral.  
Electoral volatility inevitably decreases the incumbency of parliamentarians 
and governments. Between 2008 and 2017, a total of 95 changes in government 
took place in the 31 European democracies, on average more than three per 
year. Many of these changes took place during the legislative term without 
leading to a new election. Changes in government were especially frequent in 
the eleven post-communist democracies, altogether 44 in the eight years be-
tween 2008 and 2017, on average 5.5 per year. The electoral success of new 
parties is another indicator of an increasingly mobile electorate. In the 68 elec-
tions under study, 59 new parties were able to gain first-time parliamentary 
representation. Some of them even managed to achieve a substantial share of 
the total vote. New parties have been particularly successful in the post-
communist and the Southern European democracies. The party systems of the 
established democracies have been more stable in this respect, but even here 
eight new parties appeared on the scene from 2009 to 2016, including the PVV 
(Wilders), the True Fins and the Sweden Democrats. In the German Bundestag 
elections of 2017, the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) gained 12.6% of the 
total vote. La Republique en Marche’s appearance in the 2017 election for the 
French Assemblée Nationale was certainly the most spectacular in this group of 
countries. The party received 28.2% of the votes in the first round and a stag-
gering 43.1% in the second round of the elections, which was enough for win-
ning a majority of the seats. 
Many of the new parties that have appeared on the scene are not just new, 
but also different. There is near unanimous agreement among social scientists 
that the last decades have not only seen a decline in party identification and in 
support for established parties, but also a rise of populist movements, parties 
and political leaders (for example Inglehart and Norris 2016; Inglehart 2017; 
Cox 2017; Self and Hicken 2018).2 The perceived academic importance of that 
phenomenon has even warranted the publication of a handbook of populism 
(Kaltwasser et al. 2017). There is wide agreement that populism is character-
ized by an anti-elite stance directed against established parties and policies and 
an emphasis on giving power (back) to the ordinary people. The literature deals 
mostly with right-wing populism, assuming that populism is critical of globali-
zation and emphasizes the importance of an ethnic and cultural homogeneity of 
nations (Mudde 2008; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017). This goes hand in hand 
with hostility against globalization and rejection of transnational institutions 
(UN, NATO or the EU). While the number of successful right-wing populist 
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support for European populist parties and their participation in governments (Boros et al. 
2017). 
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parties is much larger, there is, however, also populism on the left, for instanc-
es Syriza in Greece, Podemos in Spain and the Cinque Stelle in Italy. 
2.  Towards a Unified Theory of Representative Elites 
The shifting focus of research on elites in representative democracies coincided 
with the development of a set of theorems collectively and commonly referred 
to as the Theory of Democratic Elitism. This term was coined by Peter 
Bachrach in his book with the same name (Bachrach 1967). It included a scath-
ing review of current elite theory, which – so Bachrach claimed – focused 
exclusively on elite integration and seemed to assume that the masses were 
largely irrelevant for politics. This preoccupation of elite theory with elite 
integration started from the assumption of classic elite theory that complex 
societies require collective decision-making institutions to make binding deci-
sions and to allocate the power necessary for the enforcement of those deci-
sions, thereby assigning political leadership a central role. 
Meanwhile, modern elite theory has acknowledged the crucial importance of 
citizens in today’s democracies. It has moved away from its previous preoccu-
pation with elite structures and has increasingly taken into account elite-citizen 
relations. This shift acknowledges that democratic political elites act as repre-
sentatives of social groups and that they cannot be adequately studied without 
simultaneously taking into consideration social structure and the behavior of 
the populace (e.g. Best and Higley 2010). These considerations denote the 
degree of elite integration and the quality of elite-citizen linkages as equally 
central elements of the theory of democratic elitism. Elite integration is the 
prerequisite for effective collective decision-making and requires cooperative 
relations among the elites involved in these decisions. Conversely, elite-citizen 
linkages imply that political elites act as representatives of the groups of citi-
zens who have entrusted them with the power to represent their interests 
(Hoffmann-Lange 2018). It is obvious that a high degree of elite integration 
and the representation of group interests cannot be maximized simultaneously. 
The set of propositions constituting the theory of democratic elitism has, how-
ever, never been formalized nor systematically integrated into a unified theory 
of representative elites. 
Accordingly, a recent publication has stated that “theorizing has not kept 
pace with the collection of more diversified and rich empirical data about polit-
ical elites” and that there is “no general and accepted theory that drives studies 
today, and its absence is a main challenge“ (Best and Higley 2018, 5). Our 
suggestion is, therefore, to merge three theorems to form what we see as an 
outline of a more comprehensive theory of representative elites: the antagonis-
tic cooperation theorem, which addresses insider-insider relations at elite level; 
the principal-agent theorem, which addresses insider-outsider relations between 
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elites and their constituents; and the challenge-response theorem, which ad-
dresses the causes and course of elite change.3 All three theorems are affected 
and, in one way or another, challenged by what is seen by many observers as 
the present ‘crisis’ of representative democracy. In the following, we will 
demonstrate how a linkage of the three theorems provides a good explanation 
for what caused and what happens in this crisis. 
The theorem of ‘antagonistic cooperation’ explains why and how political 
elites cooperate and limit their conflicts in power competitions. The term was 
coined by the early American sociologist William G. Sumner (Best 2009) to 
denote how adversaries may enter into limited but durable partnerships in order 
to pursue common interests and maintain a mutually beneficial social order. 
Antagonistic cooperation leads to association, but cannot be equated with com-
plete social integration, because the conflicting partners do not abandon their 
antagonistic positions in social and political controversies. At an early stage of 
their cooperation their actions are governed by the logic of the prisoners’ di-
lemma, i.e. to renounce large but short term gains from confrontations for the 
prospect to profit from smaller but durable gains from long term cooperation. 
The decisive premise is here ‘durable’, because cooperation is fragile and 
prone to collapse if crucial parameters change and particularly if an endgame 
constellation occurs. To make cooperation durable, it needs formal institutions 
and informal norms that sanction defection. If antagonistic cooperation is suc-
cessfully maintained over an extended period of time, mutual trust will emerge 
between the parties involved and will further enhance their bonds.  
In a 2009 article in Comparative Sociology, the application of an amended 
version of the theorem of antagonistic cooperation to representative elites and 
their political competition was proposed (Best 2009). Indeed, the concept 
seems to be particularly useful to describe and explain processes of elite inte-
gration and especially for understanding representative elite behaviors related 
to self-privilege, self-preservation and self-empowerment. An overarching 
normative consensus over fundamental principles of pluralist democracy is, 
however, a necessary complement of elites’ antagonistic cooperation because it 
legitimizes the institutions that sustain it, confirms the elite status of the actors 
involved, fixes the rules of the game, moderates the conflicts between elite 
factions and sanctions non-compliance. Normative integration is also a means 
to address the free-rider problem of factions of elites who are not cooperating 
while profiting from the cooperation of others.  
The consensus emerging from antagonistic cooperation enables elites to 
moderate conflicts in societies at large, whereas divided elites are prone to 
                                                             
3 The theoretical propositions outlined in this part of the introduction have been introduced 
in a series of earlier publications. See here also references to the relevant literature: Best et 
al. 2000; Best 2007; Best 2009; Best 2010; Best 2018c; Best and Vogel 2012a and b; Best 
and Vogel 2014; Best and Semenova 2015; Best and Vogel 2018a; Vogel et al. 2018. 
HSR 43 (2018) 4  │  16 
intensify or even create societal conflicts. The conflict intensity within cooper-
ating elites is converging towards a balance point where the advantages of 
cooperation are offset against the disadvantages resulting from their restraint of 
political competition. These disadvantages overwhelmingly originate from 
supporters and voters who feel estranged from their cooperating representatives 
and cut off from processes of political decision making and their outcomes. 
While an amended concept of antagonistic cooperation helps to explain why 
and under what conditions conflicting elite groups will provide effective lead-
ership and adhere to rules for political competition and power transfers, it has 
been suggested that an amended version of the principal-agent theorem may be 
used to understand problems inherent in relations between representative elites 
and ordinary citizens (Strøm et al 2006; Best 2010). When applied to repre-
sentative democracies, principal-agent theory depicts electorates as principals 
that commission agents, i.e. political elites, to act on their behalf. The insider-
outsider relation established here is, however, characterized by a massive 
asymmetry: the agents, i.e. the elites, enjoy a far wider latitude of action and 
are much better informed than their principals, i.e. their electorates and selec-
torates. They also pursue their own interests, and are intent on increasing their 
agency, their security and the resources at their disposal, while principals, i.e. 
citizens, expect accountability, responsiveness and providence from their 
agents. Citizens and selectorates make use of (de-)selecting and (de-)electing 
their representative when they want to sanction or reward them for their behav-
ior and their performance. We therefore suggest conceiving the asymmetrical 
relations between representative elites and ordinary citizens as a manifestation 
of antagonistic representation. 
As in antagonistic cooperation, there is a balancing point in principal-agent 
relations when agency – i.e. the aptitude of elites to provide successful leader-
ship – is offset against their accountability and responsiveness. However, the 
balancing points of antagonistic cooperation and of the principal-agent relation 
differ systematically because, by trading with the political adversary, repre-
sentatives have to routinely ignore some concerns of their constituents. This 
situation can be tolerated by citizens and managed by elites if the issues at 
stake are of limited salience and if relations between constituencies and ‘their’ 
representatives are still shrouded by deference and trust. If, however, both 
balancing points are moving too far apart, either antagonistic cooperation or the 
principal-agent relation, or both, will be in jeopardy of breaking down. In such 
a situation, every possible line of conduct is problematic: elites can either 
abandon their common balancing point of antagonistic cooperation and adapt to 
the preferences of their constituents or they can uphold their antagonistic coop-
eration and lose the support of their constituents. Voters can either choose the 
‘exit’ option and become non-voters or they can choose the ‘voice’ option and 
support outsiders and counter-elites (Hirschman 1970). They will opt for voice, 
i.e. for alternative agents who are at the fringes or outside the circle of cooper-
HSR 43 (2018) 4  │  17 
ating antagonists, if a highly salient issue is not or is not expected to be tackled 
by established representative elites. With regard to elites, mobilization for and 
representation related to non-consensual positions will break up the consensus 
of established representative elites. This is because newcomers enter the elite 
who are not committed to the norms and practices underlying elite consensus, 
while some established elites will abandon the consensus to compete with 
outsiders and insiders on a non-consensual platform.  
These developments will have long lasting consequences and will lead to a 
change of the elite setting from a consensual to a conflictual mode by perma-
nently transforming the structure of opportunities for political competition and 
by shattering the normative basis of elite consensus: universalistic humanitari-
an norms are at risk of being abandoned in favor of particularistic solidarity 
norms, thereby favoring communities of insiders – nationally, ethnically, cul-
turally or socio-economically – over humanity at large (Higley 2016). If and 
when this abandonment happens, the communality, which has overarched 
socio-economic or ideological cleavages and international conflicts within and 
between countries for many decades, will be surrendered. This would lead to a 
deep crisis of representative democracy, brought about, not by an economic 
depression or by social upheaval, but by internal contradictions emanating from 
relations within representative elites, and between representative elites and 
their constituents. To avoid this crisis, an adequate response that satisfies both 
the needs of elite consensus and of elites’ responsiveness has to be found.  
These considerations touch fundamental assumptions of the ‘neo’- and 
‘demo-elitisms’ (Körösényi 2018). An elites-population gap inevitably results 
from elite consensus and elite integration and this elites-population gap tends to 
break up elite consensus. This is because it creates opportunities for outsiders 
and counter-elites to enter the ranks of the top-players. This means that instead 
of solidifying the bases of representative democracies, an unrestrained consen-
sus occurs that risks impairing the responsiveness of representative elites and 
thereby representation itself. In this process, the population is not a mere 
soundboard, but an active player, a potential agent of change who poses new 
challenges, offers new opportunities and throws up new contenders. The popu-
lar pressure for change may evolve without the coordinating involvement of 
elites, because coordination is unnecessary for the production of uniform be-
havior in large parts of the population and for the development of new and 
possibly hostile environments for established elites. Reproductive behavior, 
migration and mass consumption are cases of uncoordinated, but aggregated 
mass behaviors which do not qualify for collective action, but may nevertheless 
develop into massive challenges for political elites. The refugee crisis of 1989, 
which brought down the communist rule in the GDR, is an example of the fatal 
damage such developments can do to an established elite system. 
Both, elite research and elite theory, should therefore consider un-
coordinated mass behavior as one possible trigger of fundamental elite change. 
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Established elites may, however, also be challenged by coordinated collective 
action unleashed by counter-elites or by debilitating change within their own 
ranks, which impairs their ability to exercise their power and to control their 
reproduction. While elite systems are universal, the elite status of a specific 
group of people and the regimes of specific elite systems are inherently precar-
ious. They have to be defended against challengers and adapted to changing 
environments.  
In the case of European representative elites, these observations led to the 
suggestion that their patterns of long term change can be interpreted as re-
sponses to fundamental challenges confronting them roughly sequentially with 
state and nation building, industrialization and the emergence of mass democ-
racy (Best et al. 2000, Best 2007). Representative elites’ recruitment was con-
ceptualized here as the outcome of complex interactions within and between 
party organizations or caucuses and the general electorate. These interactions 
are driven by the pressure of competition for the popular vote.4 It manifested 
itself first in the process of nation building by an influx of ‘symbol specialists’ 
(like university professors) and specialists in the application of executive power 
(like administrative civil servants) as representative elites. In periods of accel-
erated industrialization, the share of economic elites typically increased. By the 
turn of the twentieth century, with the emergence of party based mass democ-
racy, there was a significant influx in specialists in mass mobilization, such as 
trade union functionaries. 
During the 1940s, there emerged what we identify as the ‘consensus chal-
lenge’, that is, the need to establish consensually unified polities and societies 
as a primary precondition for the defeat or containment first of Nazism and 
then of Communism, both of which were seen as deadly threats to western 
representative elites, whose status, values and the societal order they represent-
ed were at stake. The integration and the mediation of conflicts within and 
between western democracies were the order for the day. In the course of this 
development the public sector became the dominant occupational background 
among representative elites, a development grounded primarily in the loyalty of 
public servants to the established political order and their competence in redis-
tributive welfare state politics. After the 1940s, we see also, on average, a 
decrease in turnover and an increase of incumbency to levels never previously 
attained (Best 2007; Best and Semenova 2015). 
Corporate interest mediation, the extension of welfare state benefits, the es-
tablishment of catch-all parties and the propagation of concepts like ‘open 
society’, pluralist polities and market economy formed the bases and instru-
ments for consensus creation at elite and general population levels. The roots of 
                                                             
4 We refer here to the evidence DATACUBE, EurElite and EASE projects gathered between 
1989 and 2018, covering the period between 1848 and the present (Best and Cotta 2000b; 
Best and Edinger 2006 ). 
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the universalistic values used to cement the consensus paradigm and to mobi-
lize support for it, are found in the secular doctrines of the enlightenment. They 
first developed into the Wilsonian principles, which failed to be implemented 
after the First World War, and finally became canonized in the 1941 Atlantic 
Charter, the programmatic basis for the Anglo-American anti-Nazi alliance. 
Although there were always outsiders and antagonists who could not be incor-
porated in the anti-totalitarian alliance, the consensus paradigm formed a solid 
basis for elite co-operations within western democracies and their supranational 
alliances like NATO and the EU. In 1989/90 it seemed to have triumphed and 
become the foundation of a new world order (Fukuyama 1989). It became clear 
that a turning point had been reached when Edvard Shewardnadse, the Soviet 
Foreign Minister at that time, officially renounced the doctrine of international 
class struggle and embraced general humanitarian principles in a speech to the 
United Nations General Assembly. 
The pre-1990 consensus was, however, a system mainly forged by fear. 
With the fall of communism in Eastern Europe and China’s capitalist conver-
sion, the single most important factor that had established and stabilized post-
war western democracies disappeared. Almost immediately after these events, 
we see a sharp adjustment of systemic instability indicators, such as a decrease 
of western European representative elites’ incumbency and an increase in turn-
over rates to the levels of the late 1940s and early 1950s (Best and Semenova 
2015). We also see a decline of MPs who had their occupational background in 
the public service and therefore close ties to the existing constitutional order, 
sometimes enforced by an oath of allegiance. At a systemic level, the breakup 
of the Italian party system in the early 1990s, which resulted in the first Ber-
lusconi Government (arguably the first right wing populist government in post-
1945 Europe), the emergence of the Front National as a serious contender in 
French elections, the appearance of Le Pen père as a second round contender 
for the French presidency, the inclusion of Haider’s FPÖ in an ÖVP-led Aus-
trian Government, and the rejection of the draft of the European Constitution in 
several referenda, are further symptoms that it was not only in the post-
communist East but also in ‘old’ western democracies that a new era had start-
ed in the 1990s and that western European democracies were facing a new 
challenge. It is significant that the cracks in the structure of western European 
political elites and the setting of western political systems started to appear 
immediately after the breakdown of eastern European communism and the 
transformation of Chinese communism.  
We have interpreted these developments as manifestations of a ‘legitimacy 
challenge’ that has emerged within the political systems of western democra-
cies, rather than through the external confrontations that characterized the 
period of the consensus challenge (Best 2007). We relate this argument to 
Toynbee’s theorem, which states that in facing external challenges, collective 
actors produce internal challenges that surface after these actors have prevailed 
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over their initial challengers (1946). These new internal challenges target elite 
quality, i.e. the ability of a representative democracy to produce efficient and 
accountable political elites. Institutional settings for elite recruitment, such as 
the cartel party based on arrangements between politicians to appropriate and 
share the resources of the state, might be suitable to meet a consensus chal-
lenge, thereby creating a consensual political elite united by common material 
interests. In the long run, however, this undermines the legitimacy of repre-
sentative democracy, as the in-group/out-group differential would become too 
large to be justifiable by the achievements of the incumbents. The true nature 
of democracy is blurred if the competitive struggle for power is impeded. The 
emergence of the legitimacy challenge indicated that there can been more con-
sensus in a consensual political elite than a consolidated democracy can endure. 
The closure of the political market through political professionalization and the 
pooling of interests between formally competing parties is an autocatalytic 
process that may jeopardize the workings of democracy (Best 2007). 
3.   Populism: A Case in Point 
These developments, to use an adapted quote from the Communist Manifesto, 
called up ‘the specter of populism’ (Arditi 2004; Canovan 1999; Cox 2017; 
Fieschi 2018; Best 2018c). Among established representative elites of the 
West, this ‘specter’ evokes a sentiment of threat posed by political figures and 
movements who challenge the established norms, practices and organizational 
settings of Western democracies. Within the legal frameworks of existing insti-
tutions, these challengers introduce deviant institutional concepts and ‘illegiti-
mate’ discourses into the mainstream politics of western elites. They thereby 
express a widespread discontent of citizens with the isolation and the outcomes 
of the politics of representative institutions. Populism manifests itself, inter 
alia, in a sharp rise of votes for populist parties, mainly right wing populist 
parties, and in attempts of established parties to (re-)define themselves by 
adopting populist stratagems. This discontent endured and grew in the period of 
economic recovery after the world financial crisis, even spreading into coun-
tries with relatively successful economies and settled societies, such as Swit-
zerland, the Netherlands and the Nordic countries. It is also evident in Germa-
ny, which has experienced a very long period of economic growth and a sharp 
decline in unemployment, including East Germany, where there was mass 
unemployment until the beginning of the century. However, the results of sur-
veys taken in mid-September 2018 show that, in Germany, support for the right 
wing populist Alternative für Deutschland had increased to 18 percent, surpas-
sing that of the Social Democrats (Deutschland-Trend September 21, 2018).  
It is – at least at first sight – paradoxical that even a (relatively) good eco-
nomic performance and extensive welfare state systems have been unable to 
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protect established representative elites and their regimes of elite recruitment 
and reproduction against the onslaught of populist challengers with their ag-
gressive anti-elitist rhetoric and agenda. It also raises the questions of why this 
is so and what impact might this development have on the future of representa-
tive democracy.  
The most precise and convincing definition of populism has been given by 
Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017) who conceptualize populism as an ideational 
construct rather than a simple reflection of structural conditions. They see it as 
comprising perceptions and assumptions about socio-economic and political 
conditions, while at the same time being only a thin-centered ideology, in con-
trast to a full-blown ideology that provides an explanation of the nature of 
society and how it ought to be (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017, 7). As a thin-
centered ideology, it needs to take its substantive focus and normative implica-
tions from other ideologies, which gives populists a great deal of flexibility in 
their choice of topics for political mobilization. The constitutive element of 
populism, however, is a Manichean distinction between the ‘good people’ and 
the ‘evil elite’. As both terms are empty signifiers that can be applied to differ-
ent groups of people, which allows populists to claim the right to speak for ‘the 
people’.  
Populists also share a stylistic communality by openly rejecting traditional 
ways of doing politics and by being more aggressive in articulating their criti-
cism of political adversaries. Huber and Schimpf have likened their appearance 
to a drunken guest “spilling out the painful truths“ (2016, 119), meaning that 
populists point out the shortcomings of the established political actors, their 
neglect of important issues and their de-politicization of problems for which 
they have no solution. Such criticism is not only addressed to political elites but 
also to other important elites, particularly those pertaining to business and the 
media. 
Populist movements concentrate on mobilizing dissatisfied voters by point-
ing out the deficiencies of politics and by blaming politicians as being respon-
sible for all societal problems or at least for failing to tackle them successfully. 
This is especially true for their claim to represent the interests of the ordinary 
people whom they portray as suffering from the strains produced by globaliza-
tion and immigration, which they blame on unfair economic practices by other 
countries or on governments that spend too much money on immigrants rather 
than taking care of their own people. While this suggests that they are con-
cerned about the needy, Inglehart and Norris (2016) have pointed out that such 
claims have the main purpose of mobilizing voters who feel that social change 
is threatening traditional values and their way of life. The authors argue that 
support for populist authoritarian parties is “motivated by a backlash against 
the cultural changes linked with the rise of Postmaterialist and Self-expression 
values, far more than by economic factors“ (2016, 446). They also assume that 
this backlash has an economic basis in the decline of real incomes, an increase 
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in the number of people with lower education holding precarious jobs, and the 
rise in economic inequality, particularly in high-income countries (2016, 448-9; 
see also Fuchs and Klingemann 2019). 
In 2009/2010 a parallel representative survey amongst German representa-
tives and the enfranchised population already showed a vast disparity in atti-
tudes towards immigration from non-EU countries, in that representatives were 
overwhelmingly favorable and citizens unfavorable concerning immigration 
from EU-outsiders (Best and Vogel 2012a; Vogel 2019). This divide was par-
ticularly deep and amounted to misrepresentation between supporters and MPs 
of left-wing parties. It was shown that this gap was the result of a disaccord 
between universalistic values, prevalent amongst elites (favoring free move-
ment in a globalized world) and particularistic norms, prevalent amongst citi-
zens, who restrict solidarity to members of their own community (Best 2018 a 
and b; Fukuyama 2018). This disaccord became a driving force for welfare-
state nativism and demands for the ‘ethnicization’ of Western welfare-state 
policies through citizenship-based restrictions concerning welfare payments. In 
Europe, the mobilization of social protectionism against immigrants was ampli-
fied by a resistance to the influx of ethno-culturally very different people from 
Islamic countries, which has increased massively since 2015 and fueled a rig-
orous rejection of refugees, particularly in eastern and central eastern Europe, 
including East Germany, where no Islamic communities had previously exist-
ed. In contrast, large parts of European political elites were and still are sup-
porting policies of an inclusive multiculturalism with attempts at integrating 
distinct ethno-cultural communities into secularized societies under the auspi-
ces of universalistic norms. Both conflicts over the (re-)distribution of welfare 
benefits (‘who gets what?’) and identity policies (‘who are we?’) relate to what 
is now called ‘the refugee crisis’. 
However, even though salient differences in policy preferences between rep-
resentatives and the represented are a necessary factor underpinning the rise of 
populist parties in representative democracies, they are not on their own a 
sufficient prerequisite for the trends observed. They must be complemented by 
differences in polity preferences; in this case, concerning the mistrust of large 
parts of the electorate in the established parties’ willingness or ability to re-
spond to its grievances. In the same 2009/2010 synoptic study of German rep-
resentative elites and the general electorate, we found indeed clear indications 
that a deep disagreement existed between the majority of the population and the 
majority of their representatives concerning the functioning of representative 
institutions and the role of representatives: voters were expecting responsive-
ness of representatives to their demands, whereas the representatives cited their 
role as leaders and guides for the electorate (Best and Vogel, 2011; 2012a; 
2012b; 2018b; Vogel 2019). Again, this gap in polity preferences extended 
across the followers and representatives of all parliamentary parties present in 
the Bundestag at that time, even including Die LINKE, whose representatives 
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had shown the greatest openness towards a bottom-upwards mode of represen-
tation. 
Accordingly, populism is the political response to the salient gap between 
citizens’ and political elites’ policy and polity preferences. It shifts the value 
basis from universalistic norms to particularistic norms, from concerns for 
humanity at large to those for national communities and one’s own country – 
‘America’, ‘Italy’ etc. first! This shift of focus is supported by the fact that 
constituencies are made up of nationals and can therefore exert powerful pres-
sure to implementing nationalistic policies. Most voters have, in contrast to 
their representatives, a clear preference for the delegate over the trustee model 
of representation (Best and Vogel 2018a). By voting for populist parties, they 
are showing their parliamentary agents just who they see as the principal.  
The theoretical discussion dealing with the relationship between populism 
and democracy is of immediate relevance for elite theory. It emphasizes the 
anti-elitist stance of populist movements and refers to the fact that populism 
exploits the ambivalent promises of democracy. In this vein, Canovan (1999) 
has argued that democracy involves both a redemptive and a pragmatic face. It 
promises to give power to the people and to achieve a better world by political 
action. But at the same time, it is a pragmatic way of governing based on a 
complex system of state institutions and rules that include regular elections, 
decisions by legislative majorities and a liberal constitution protecting individ-
ual liberties. Reducing politics to a pragmatic quest for effective government 
would, however, run the danger of inviting corruption by government officials:  
For many of those around the world who have to put up with civil war or vio-
lent repression, pragmatic democracy may seem supremely enviable. But to 
those who take its benefits for granted, democracy would not seem legitimate 
if there were nothing more to it than this. For democracy is also a repository 
of the aspirations characteristic of modern politics. Inherent in modern democ-
racy, in tension with its pragmatic face, is faith in secular redemption: the 
promise of a better world through action by the sovereign people. (Canovan 
1999, 11) 
Whenever the gap between the “haloed democracy and the grubby business of 
politics“ becomes too wide, “populists tend to move on to the vacant territory, 
promising in place of the dirty world of party maneuvering the shining ideal of 
democracy renewed“ (1999,11).5  
Arditi (2004) complemented Canovan’s analysis of populism by a discus-
sion of its potentially problematic effects on the political system. He argued 
that populism can take three different forms that have different consequences. 
                                                             
5  This is something liberal thinkers have not adequately reflected. They believe that rational 
appeals are sufficient for convincing people of the advantages of democracy. Dahrendorf 
(1997) has clearly seen this deficit of liberal democracy and acknowledged that democracy 
is a cold project that does not claim to appeal to the hearts and souls of the people. He 
hoped, however, that social linkages (Ligaturen) could make up for this.  
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The first is that the media take on the function of mavericks by constantly 
scrutinizing and criticizing government policies. A second form is populism as 
a “mode of participation that departs from the etiquette of political salons with-
out apologizing for its brashness”. These two forms have the effect to both 
disturbing and renewing the political process. The third form, however, “comes 
to haunt political democracy and to endanger the very framework in which it 
can function”. This is when distrust for institutional procedures and the intrica-
cies of the legislative process lead to “discretional adherence to the rule of law“ 
and runs the danger to slip into authoritarian practices (2004, 142). The latter 
danger is the reason why Simon Tormey, who otherwise has severely criticized 
the deficiencies of representative democracy (2015), has argued that populism 
can be democracy’s deadly cure (2017).6  
A particular danger of populist movements for representative democracy lies 
in their claim to represent the people. This is based on the assumption that there 
is something like a monist will of the people, a predetermined ‘common good a 
priori’, which they claim to pursue. This implies a denial of the pluralist nature 
of society and of the existence of conflicting interests. It denies the necessity of 
what Fraenkel called a ‘common good a posteriori’, which can only be deter-
mined in a complex process of opinion formation that takes into account the 
diversity of different points of view (1991, 300). The claim to superior 
knowledge of what ‘the people’ really want implies an immunity to criticism, 
which may be denounced as being based on a false perception of the people’s 
true will and can easily turn into an authoritarian or even totalitarian claim to 
power. The empirical analysis of Huber and Schimpf takes into account the 
Janus-faced character of populism. The authors assumed that populist parties 
can be beneficial by broadening the spectrum of issues debated in parliaments 
if they are in opposition, while they are apt to impair the quality of democracy 
if they participate in government (2016, 111). This hypothesis was confirmed 
in their analysis based on aggregate data7 including European cabinets for the 
period 2000 to 2012. 
The foregoing considerations have shown that populism is a phenomenon 
resulting from unfulfilled promises of democracy that is particularly likely to 
                                                             
6  In his review of Chantal Mouffe's book 'For a Left Populism', Longo raised similar reserva-
tions about the potential dangers of left-wing populism. 
7  In addition to the participation of populist parties in government and opposition, they took 
into account a wide range of other independent variables, and used democratic quality as 
dependent variable. It should be noted, however, that the empirical basis of the study is not 
entirely satisfactory since only ten percent of all cabinets included populist parties during 
the period under study. Unfortunately, the authors also failed to supply sufficient documen-
tation on the countries in which populist parties achieved cabinet status during this time. It 
can be assumed that this was mostly the case in post-communist democracies with only a 
few instances and short periods in established West European democracies, except for the 
SVP in Switzerland. 
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spread in times of rapid social change when established patterns of political 
crisis management are confronted with new challenges. Theoretically, it is the 
opposite of elitism. “Elitism shares populism’ basic monist and Manichean 
distinction of society between a homogeneous ‘good’ and a homogeneous 
‘evil’, but it holds an opposite view on the virtues of the groups” (Mudde and 
Kaltwasser 2017, 7). While a lot has been written about the causes of popu-
lism’s rise in recent years, Moíses Naím has argued that it is not a new phe-
nomenon at all, but rather “a strategy to obtain and retain power“ by “exacer-
bating socio-cultural division and conflict“ (2017). This strategy includes 
magnifying the nation’s problems, criminalizing the opposition, discrediting 
experts and delegitimizing the media. Basically, Naím claims that populists are 
simply counter-elites vying for power. Their glorification of the simple people 
and their demands for more citizen influence is nothing but an empty promise 
to mobilize supporters into believing that they care about their problems. Simi-
larly, Mudde (2008) has argued that it is not sufficient only to take into account 
the demand side of populism, but that we should also look at the supply side, 
implying that this is a vehicle which can be used by populists to mobilize on 
pre-existing grievances. Thus, the rise of populism in developed democracies is 
also attributable to the activities of political entrepreneurs. 
Is the specter of populism therefore ringing the death bell for western liberal 
democracy? Recent survey results suggest a paradoxical answer to this ques-
tion: in 2017 a survey in East Germany observed an increase of “satisfaction 
with the functioning of democracy in practice” to levels which had never be-
fore been seen: about two thirds of the respondents were satisfied (Best 2018). 
Although this high degree of satisfaction had slightly declined by 2018, a fol-
low-up survey executed during the epic Merkel/Seehofer clash over border 
controls to bar immigrant from entering the country showed it to be still the 
third highest level since 2000. This increase in satisfaction with democracies’ 
reality seems to coincide with an increasingly sympathetic response by estab-
lished political elites to popular concerns about illegal immigration, as well as 
with a tightening of border controls, an application of stricter rules for asylum 
seekers, and serious attempts to send back immigrants who do not qualify for a 
protected status. The fact that populist parties had meanwhile established them-
selves as strong parliamentary players and even – in some European countries – 
as parties of government, can be also viewed as proof of systemic responsive-
ness of western representative democracy and its ability to integrate outsiders 
and counter-elites, in the given case, populists. 
The integration of populists may – at least in the German case – be support-
ed by the fact that the self-declared counter-elite of right-wing populists has a 
socio-demographic makeup which is very similar to the established representa-
tive elite, in particular those of its members who sit on the right of the Bundes-
tag (Best and Vogel 2018b). Only their lack of previous incumbency in the 
Bundestag and their very low pre-mandate experience in holding political of-
HSR 43 (2018) 4  │  26 
fice at the local or regional level justify the qualification of AfD MPs to be 
considered as members of a counter-elite, even though such a lack is a defining 
characteristic of any newcomer party. All the other indicators show a solid 
anchoring of the AfD representatives in the traditional social and political 
order, however. We were particularly surprised by the fact that, of all parlia-
mentary parties, the ‘anti-system’ AfD has the highest share of public service 
employees in its ranks. With these backgrounds, which are very different from 
those of representatives of previous right wing extremists parties after 1945 –
and also differs from the NSDAP in the Weimar Reichstag (Best et al. 2000) –, 
the AfD projects itself as a component of a conservative coalition with estab-
lished right wing or center right parties. 
At the level of electorates, a recent Eurobarometer survey has unexpectedly 
shown that support for the EU has reached its highest level for 35 years among 
European citizens (Eurobarometer 2018). This is an indication that the present 
populist surge will not necessarily evolve into a traditional nationalism, involv-
ing serious conflicts between the EU member states, but it could become the 
starting point for pan-European nationalism – the ideology of ‘Fortress Europe’ 
– set against a seemingly hostile and threatening outside world. This evokes, 
however, memories of a deeply tainted past: The term ‘Fortress Europe’ was 
originally coined by Goebbel’s propaganda ministry in the final phase of WWII 
in order to mobilize European support for the Nazi war machine in its fight 
against the Soviet Union. 
Both developments would dramatically change ‘Western Democracy’. They 
would also fit into the challenge-response concept of political elites’ change in 
that a new external challenge is replacing the ‘legitimacy challenge’ as the 
prime mover of elite transformation. We suggest calling it the ‘globalization 
challenge,’ which is resulting from the threats – perceived or real – posed to 
the level of wealth, individual freedom and collective identities prevalent in 
western democracies by global asymmetries and disparities in demographic 
development, economic performance, social inequality and collective norms. 
Western democracies’ responses to this challenge might be exclusion, oppres-
sion and walling-off.  
It seems obvious, therefore, that the integration of populist parties by ex-
tending the spectrum of the elite consensus could be a preferable response of 
established representative elites. This would involve the inclusion of populists 
into established elite settings, thereby corrupting them with the prospect of 
becoming insiders. Established elites should be aware, however, that this could 
entail the risk of compromising and ultimately losing the universalistic basis of 
their previous consensus. Unfortunately, German history provides an example 
of such an attempt at including an outsider going horribly wrong (Struve 1973). 
It would also mean embracing policies that are incompatible with general hu-
manitarian norms and the unveiling of an unsavory side of democracy – ugly, 
but not unfamiliar since the days of its Athenian beginnings (Cartledge 2016). 
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